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Introduction
In a context of ebbing external factor tailwinds, Latin America and other emerging markets are once again engaging in serious introspection on how to attain higher per capita incomes. In particular, the search is now turning towards domestic sources of growth. Given the present growth slowdown, governments are now facing tighter budget constraints, and therefore they must be very selective in how they allocate spending to facilitate private sector growth and attain larger per capita incomes.
Recent research (Pagés, 2010) suggests that much of the gap in income per capita levels between Latin American countries and the United States is not due to a lack of factor accumulation, but rather to a fall in productivity levels vis-à-vis those of the United States. Thus, a key question is how governments can help in increasing productivity by boosting those sectors that influence productivity levels; i.e., should they invest in education, health or infrastructure?
And which of those sectors provide the largest return in maximizing the chances of reaching a larger income per capita? This is a complex question, as the impact that an increase in each of these variables may have on productivity and hence on income per capita may very well depend on the levels of other variables, implying non-linear effects. As discussed in detail by Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005) , binding constraints may affect each other so that the relaxation of one constraint may not necessarily lead to more investment and higher growth as long as some other related constraint still binds.
But even if these nonlinearities could be identified, a second question emerges: how should one determine the relevance of each constraint? This is largely an empirical question, and much about it can be learned from the experiences of countries that were able to address these constraints and reach higher income per capita levels. Of course, there may be unique elements to each of these experiences that are hard to assess. However, there may also be several elements that are shared among these experiences, and these can be captured by empirical models.
A popular strategy to identify priorities for growth is to look into constraints to investment, an approach that became widely known as "growth diagnostics" (see Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco, 2005) . Instead of drawing on a laundry list of sectors and a "wholesale reform" approach, this methodology largely looks for signals indicating whether the problem of lagging investment lies in inadequate returns to investment, inadequate private appropriability of returns, or inadequate access to finance. It provides very well-structured reasoning on how to discard or keep potential constraints in the analysis, serving as an instrument to identify hurdles to investment and growth. However, it does not provide a framework to quantify explicitly the value of the constraints, although it relies on a relevant set of variables to make an informed assessment.
Another popular approach consists of looking into sets of indicators and their gaps relative to some benchmark to determine priorities. This can materialize into rankings across different dimensions, such as the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report (2014) which, using an executive opinion survey, looks into institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country and in turn set the level of prosperity that can be reached by an economy.
1 Along the same lines, the World Bank's Doing Business Report (2014) compares countries using a series of measures of business regulations and their enforcement to facilitate firm start-up and growth, with the view that without a dynamic private sector, no economy can provide a good, and sustainable, standard of living. 2 This methodology also provides rankings, as well as distances to the frontier-or best observed performance.
Another approach employing gaps used by the OECD, called "Going for Growth,"
focuses on gaps in outcome and policy variables across different sectors affecting productivity and participation, and it determines priorities when gaps in a particular sector (both in outcomes and policies) lie below the OECD average (see OECD, 2005 ). Yet another approach, developed at the IDB (see Borensztein et al., 2014) , likewise analyzes development gaps, but the novelty here is that gaps are constructed relative to predicted values consistent with a country's income per capita. Once these gaps are identified, the largest ones are chosen to determine priorities.
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While these approaches provide a framework for a systematic analysis and identification of the largest gaps in particular areas of interest and using different benchmarks, they face a potential issue in that the largest gaps may or may not coincide with sectors in which the value of constraints is the largest. For example, a country may rank poorly in terms of institutions, yet it may experience high growth and a faster path to development if the institutional constraint turns out not to be very binding in that particular country. They also differ according to whether they focus on the implicit issues behind growth-such as productivity or development of the private sector-or consider all areas of development.
Although each methodology focuses on a particular set of indicators and potential restrictions, they all share the view that a set of capabilities must be developed for a country to become more productive and grow. This view is in line with Hausmann and Hidalgo (2009), who show that, even after controlling for initial levels of development, their (implicit) measure of capabilities is a useful predictor of future economic growth. 4 Moreover, Hausmann and Hidalgo (2011) argue in a theoretical model that since many products require the combination of several capabilities, countries with few capabilities will have a lower probability of finding alternative uses for any additional capability than countries having a large pool of capabilities, thus leaving countries with low capabilities with little incentive to invest in the accumulation of additional capabilities. This nonlinear view is also shared by Rodrik (2013a) , who embeds capabilities in a model in which an economy's long-run level of productivity is determined by its capabilities, and accumulation of such capabilities must be large enough to achieve measurable increases in productivity, given the multidimensional nature of those capabilities and the complementarity among them.
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Against this methodological background, and given the relevance for Latin America of focusing more on productivity than factor accumulation (see Pagés, 2010) our approach focuses on productivity determinants and their impact on the likelihood of a country's ability to jump to a larger income-per-capita group. 6 A key contribution of the methodology we use is that, in contrast to existing methodologies, it allows for an implicit valuation of the relevance of each sector by looking into the impact that each sector has on increasing the probability of reaching a larger income per capita group. The impact of each sector is not necessarily associated with the size of the gap in that sector; that impact and the size of the gap of that sector may or may not coincide.
Using a generalized ordered Probit, this methodology learns from countries that have been able to attain larger per capita incomes-or "jumpers"-to identify priority areas. A useful aspect of this methodology is that estimated priorities are specific to each group of countries (classified by per capita incomes), so that sectors may differ in terms of their relevance in increasing the likelihood of jumping to the next income per capita cluster, depending on the group to which a country belongs. Another interesting feature of the empirical model is that the impact of each sector is conditional on the levels attained by a country in other sectors, implicitly capturing the concept of interaction across constraints and the existence of nonlinear effects in the data. Thus additional expenditure to boost education, for example, may depend on health levels. These nonlinear effects are consistent with the literature described above. They are also consistent with critiques to the Washington Consensus of the 1990s, in the sense that countries may have invested in several sectors with meager results in terms of reaching higher levels of per capita income: to the extent that investments were made across the board without properly identifying the largest constraints-and their interactions-many countries achieved results that were less successful than expected, which led to reform fatigue in more than a few cases.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our empirical strategy, and Section 3 presents the optimal choice of country clusters by income per capita. Section 4 proceeds with the estimation of Priorities for Productivity and Income (or PPIs), and Section 5 describes robustness and goodness of fit. Section 6 provides an application to the case of Peru for illustration purposes. Section 7 concludes.
Empirical Strategy
This methodology was designed with Latin American countries in mind, but given the fact that many of them have reached middle income status and aspire to advance to higher income per capita groups, it was necessary to include high income (OECD) countries in the analysis as well.
As a matter of fact, some high income countries today were recently middle income countries, so much can be learned from their experiences. Moreover, OECD countries have rich sectoral
datasets, yet another reason to include them in the analysis. 7 Thus our sample includes a total of 49 countries-19 from Latin America and the Caribbean, and 30 from the OECD.
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Given the non-linearities described above, the empirical framework that best fits these characteristics is an ordered Probit approach, in which countries are clustered into different income-per-capita groups and the likelihood of "jumping" to a higher income group is set to depend on the different factors that affect productivity. 
Optimal Choice of Country Clusters by Income per Capita
The first step of the methodology consists of grouping countries in "income per capita clusters."
For this exercise, country-time observations on (the log of) income per capita in constant U.S.
dollars (adjusted for purchasing power parity) for the 49 countries in the sample, spanning the period 2000-2012, were subject to clustering analysis. Based on residual sum of squares analysis, an optimal number of clusters can be selected. This approach, also known as the "elbow" method, looks for important reductions in the within group sum of squares as the number of clusters increases. The fact that the within-group sum of squares falls drastically from one to four groups, but little thereafter, leads to the selection of four clusters (see panel (a) of Appendix Figure A1 ).
Countries are grouped into four clusters using the hierarchical clustering method. The list of 83 indicators was constructed on the basis of consultations with each of the IDB's sectoral departments involved on the relevance of indicators to be used, as well as the existence of readily available datasets. 12 The IDB is currently engaged in the production of indicators on labor informality, innovation, and competition indicators of product market regulation indicators (in association with the World Bank and OECD), that could eventually be used once sufficiently long datasets become available. 13 These indicators try to capture as well as possible trends in each of the sectors. However, it must be acknowledged that some of the indicators used may have different roles to play at different points in time given technological change. For example, Internet access, which is a relevant indicator in explaining productivity today, may have not been so previously. However, given the relatively short time span in our sample, such technological changes are likely not an issue. 14 Hierarchical clustering methods have the characteristic that at each step of the algorithm only one object changes group (groups are nested from previous steps). The algorithm starts with as many groups as countries exist in the sample, and in every step distances are first calculated between existing groups, and then the two closest groups are merged. This is done systematically until four groups are obtained. 
Estimation of Productivity Determinant Priorities
With four income per capita clusters at hand, we proceed next with construction of the sectoral indicators. Each of the 34 variables listed in Appendix Table A1 was normalized using all population data-e.g., using information for all 49 countries throughout the period 2000-2012.
Normalized data were then used to construct each of the eight sectoral indicators, which are Appendix Table A3 ). While this is no final proof of causality, it does suggest that there is one-sided temporal precedence in that lags of changes in the aggregate sectoral indicator affect current changes in GDP per capita, but not vice versa. This is consistent with the fact that most of the indicators used are structural in that they will not be easily affected by shocks to income, as would be the case for education, where there is little chance that shocks to current GDP per capita would affect contemporaneous educational levels.
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Next we estimate an ordered generalized Probit model in which country clusters are ordered by income per capita levels (with cluster 1 being the lowest group, and cluster 4 the highest), and eight sectoral indicators are included as potential determinants of the probability that a country belonging to a particular cluster may jump to a higher income cluster. These sectors are Capital Markets, Education, Health, Infrastructure, Innovation, Integration and Trade, Labor Markets, and Telecommunications. 19 Notice that this estimation technique allows for different coefficients accompanying sectoral indicators, depending on the particular cluster being analyzed. This is done, for any 15 Once sectoral indicators are constructed, they are normalized once again. This is done so that each sectoral indicator has a zero mean and unit variance (since individual indicators in one sector are likely correlated, their average may have a variance different from one). Keeping a unit variance for the sectoral indicator is relevant for the exercises to be performed later. 16 This means that one would first observe changes in the aggregate sectoral indicator that affect income per capita in subsequent periods. 17 We do find PPP-adjusted GDP per capita to be positively cointegrated with the aggregate indicator of sectors affecting productivity. 18 However, this is not the case for all indicators. Some areas such as capital markets may be susceptible to shocks to GDP per capita, and that is why all variables in the model have been lagged to reduce potential endogeneity. 19 See Appendix Table A1 for a description of the indicators comprising each of these sectors. particular cluster, by splitting the sample into observations belonging to that income per capita cluster and observations belonging to all other higher income per capita clusters, thus exploiting differences between countries in one cluster and those in higher clusters. This is done for every cluster (except the last one), and estimation of all three models is carried out jointly. Since our estimation has four country clusters, coefficients can be estimated for the first three clusters, which are those in which countries can jump to a higher income cluster. Given that there is a good chance that residuals of any particular country are correlated, estimations are carried out using clustered errors to assess significance.
Results are shown in Table 1 are calculated using clustered errors at the country level. 21 Likelihood ratio tests were used to determine the use of these restrictions in the estimation. 22 The VIX index is a market volatility index which shows the market's expectation of 30-day volatility for a wide range of S&P 500 index options. It is widely used as a measure of international market risk conditions, capturing changes in investor risk appetite. Note: Coefficient standard deviations are estimated using clustered errors at the country level. ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level.
Interpretation of the results in Table 1 . These results point to the need to focus on different priorities for countries belonging to different income groups. We call these significant sectors Priorities for Productivity and Income (PPIs). There seems to be some common sense in the determination of priorities captured by this methodology: in lower income countries, basic priorities such as education and health seem to matter the most, whereas in lower-middle income countries priorities change to labor markets and integration, and in middle income countries the focus changes once again, this time to strengthening access to credit and infrastructure.
Since coefficients belong to standardized sectoral indicators, their value can be read directly in order to rank priorities within each cluster. For example, a 1 standard deviation rise in Infrastructure for a country in Cluster 3 increases the probability of reaching Cluster 4 by more than a 1 standard deviation increase in either Capital Markets or Health. As a result, this methodology delivers a set of PPIs that can be identified and ranked for each cluster of countries.
Robustness and Goodness of Fit
Regarding goodness of fit and robustness of these results, a series of calculations were carried out along two dimensions. First, a battery of goodness-of-fit measures were computed. These include a count pseudo-R 2 , which treats any observation with a predicted probability of 0.5 or greater as having a predicted outcome of 1 (or 0 otherwise) and then computes the number of correct matches as a share of total observations. We do this by using the corresponding cluster estimation for each observation, depending on the cluster to which it belongs. 25 This measure yields a value of 95.6 percent, indicating highly consistent predictions relative to the data. Using a more stringent adjusted pseudo-R 2 measure, accounting for the fact that some outcomes have a larger occurrence rate, yields a value of 72.5 percent, indicating relatively good performance even when adjusting for the occurrence characteristics of the sample. Another commonly used measure for Probit models is McFadden's indicator, which computes goodness of fit by comparing the log likelihood of the full model relative to that containing only an intercept. This measure yields a value of 72.9 percent, very similar to that of the adjusted pseudo-R 2 .
The second dimension involves robustness analysis of the estimated coefficients. We assess this by performing the same estimation as the one presented above 5,000 times, but randomly dropping one country-year observation at a time. Figures A2 through A10 show the resulting histograms of the estimated coefficients for each of the three clusters. All 27 coefficients show highly concentrated distributions around the estimated parameters of the original estimation including the whole sample. Summary statistics portraying these results are reproduced in Table A5 .
On average, almost 84 percent of estimated coefficients fall inside a window comprised of ½ a standard deviation to each side of the coefficient of the full sample estimation (see Table A5 , column 1), indicating high concentration. Moreover, on average 99.9 percent of the time the estimated coefficients generated randomly by changing the sample coincide with the coefficient of the original estimation in terms of being significant (or not significant) at the 5 percent level (see Table A5 , column 2). In order to measure the concentration of these distributions around the coefficient of the original estimation in each sector, we compute a measure of excess kurtosis, as well as a measure of excess kurtosis adjusted for skewness, relative to that of a normal distribution. 26, 27 All measures of excess kurtosis for each of the 27 distributions are quite high, ranging from 7.4 to 246.7 for standard kurtosis, with average excess kurtosis yielding 83.2 (see Table A5 , column 3). Even after adjusting for skewness, adjusted-kurtosis measures range from 6.9 to 161.6, with average excess kurtosis representing 60.8 (see Table A5 , column 4).
A similar exercise was performed by running 1,000 estimations, this time dropping all observations for one particular country at a time. Results go in the same direction: 77 percent of estimated coefficients fall inside a window comprised of ½ a standard deviation to each side of the coefficient of the full sample estimation, and 97.7 percent of the time the estimated coefficients generated randomly by dropping one country at a time coincide with the coefficient of the original estimation in terms of being significant (or not significant) at the 5 percent level.
Standard excess kurtosis ranges from 1.49 to 37.9, with average excess kurtosis yielding 11.8.
Adjusted-kurtosis measures range from 0.58 to 18.2, with average excess adjusted-kurtosis representing 7.2.
All these results point to heavily concentrated coefficient distributions around the original estimates. Moreover, these randomly generated coefficients share significance with those of the original estimation 97.7 to 100 percent of the time-depending on the type of robustness exercise-thus pointing to the robustness of original estimates. 26 It is well known that a property of skewed distributions is that they have larger measures of kurtosis. We adjust for this fact using Blest's measure of adjusted kurtosis (see Blest, 2003) . 27 Excess kurtosis is defined as kurtosis of the distribution minus that of a normal distribution (which has a value of 3).
An Application: The Case of Peru
We now use the results of our estimations to study the case of Peru, also providing some contrasting examples from Colombia. Analysis of this case is helpful not only to see what the methodology can deliver when put to use, but also to highlight some differences in selecting priorities with other methods and benchmarks.
Peru is a recent entrant to Cluster 3, having reached it in 2012, and it is the lowest income per capita member of this group, which includes Latin America's biggest economies as well as However, given this recent entry, it is expected that Peru's probability of jumping to Cluster 4 should be low. As a matter of fact, given that all of Peru's sectoral indicators in 2012 (the latest year available for all 34 individual indicators) lie below the mean of its new cluster, it is easy to see why the model predicts a probability close to zero of Peru jumping to Cluster 4 (see Table 2 ). Yet one can ask how much that probability would change if ½ a standard deviation were allocated to each of the PPIs identified for Cluster 3 countries. We do not choose the size of this allocation arbitrarily: the average distance in each of the sectors for countries across the different clusters is in the neighborhood of 0.5. For the case of Peru, this means allocating ½ standard deviation to Infrastructure, ½ standard deviation to Capital Markets, and another ½ standard deviation to Health, for a total allocation of 1½ standard deviations. The reason that we split the total allocation into three ½ a standard deviations across different PPIs is that allocating 1 or 1½ standard deviations to any particular PPI would imply a very large increase in that PPI, something that seems difficult to achieve. 28 Once the ½ standard deviation allocation in each of the abovementioned sectors is introduced, Peru's probability of jumping to Cluster 4 is still a low 9 percent. Even if this probability is low, there is something useful to learn about the model:
increasing each PPI individually does very little to increase this probability. For example, by increasing each of the PPIs individually by ½ a standard deviation and adding up their individual contribution to the probability-keeping other PPIs at their original levels-yields a probability value of 0.61 percent. Yet the joint impact of increasing all three PPIs simultaneously by ½ a standard deviation brings the probability up to 9 percent, highlighting the relevance of interactions among sectors when deciding on a strategy to increase income per capita levels.
Having a low probability of reaching cluster 4 makes sense for the case of Peru, because this country has only very recently reached Cluster 3, and it still has a long way to go before it can improve sectoral indicators to levels similar to those of Cluster 4. To see this, consider the values of each of the sectoral indicators in Peru as of 2012 compared to the average of its own group (Cluster 3, excluding Peru) and the average of the next income per capita group, Cluster 4.
These figures are shown in Table 2 , together with the gaps between Peru and the average of its own group as well as those between Peru and the average of the next group (columns 4 and 5).
Sectors are ranked according to the size of the gaps between Peru and the average of the next group. This is done for illustration purposes only to contrast results of the Probit priorities model with those stemming from gap analysis.
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Notice that in this case, the three largest gaps occur in Innovation, Capital Markets, and Infrastructure, two of which coincide with the PPIs defined by our methodology. However, there are large differences in the ordering of priorities by gaps when these are calculated with respect to the average of Peru's own group-a measure akin to methodologies that measure gaps relative to predicted values based on Peru's GDP per capita. In this case, the three largest gaps are in Innovation, Telecommunications, and Health, and only one of these three priorities coincides with PPIs. These differences are starker in the case of Colombia (see Table 3 ), which also belongs to Cluster 3 and thus shares PPIs with Peru. When Colombia's gaps are compared with the average of its own cluster, the largest three occur in Education, Labor, and Integration, none of which coincide with PPIs. 30 Thus, standard gap analysis may yield quite different results compared to PPIs, because gaps do not necessarily indicate the value of the restriction generated by low performance in any particular sector, something that the PPI methodology indirectly addresses by measuring which sectors are more relevant in maximizing the chances of jumping to a higher income per capita cluster. Another way to estimate the usefulness of PPIs in any particular country is to ask how many standard deviations would be needed to reach a large probability of reaching a higher cluster. For the analysis of Peru, that probability was set at 75 percent. Results show that Peru would reach that probability level if it were able to invest 2.01 standard deviations, allocating 1 standard deviation to Infrastructure, 0.51 standard deviations to Capital Markets, and ½ a standard deviation to Health. 31 Notice the non-linear impact that is present in the model: in the previous exercise we had allocated only ½ a standard deviation to each PPI, resulting in a probability of 9 percent, but now increasing Infrastructure by an additional ½ a standard deviation (for a total of 1 standard deviation) and an additional 0.01 standard deviation in Capital
Markets (for a total of 0.51 standard deviation) boosts the probability of jumping to the next cluster to 75 percent. This can be seen graphically in Figure 3 which shows-departing from Peru's probability by 2012, which is basically zero-how the probability increases as
Infrastructure is increased by up to 1 standard deviation and the Capital Markets indicator is increased by up to 0.51 standard deviations, with Health always set to a ½ a standard deviation increase. The impact of the increase in Health is not shown directly, but implicitly through the way that Infrastructure and Capital Markets affect the probability of jumping to an upper cluster.
As argued previously, the impact of Infrastructure and Capital Markets on that probability is not independent of the level of Health. Figure 3 shows that Infrastructure has the upper hand in terms of increasing the probability of reaching a higher cluster, highlighting the value of this particular PPI for countries in this cluster. However, the key message here is that its impact is significantly increased when Capital Markets are developed concomitantly. case, Infrastructure) to the second most productive sector (in this case, Capital Markets), and so on until a probability of 75 percent is reached.
Conclusions
This study is a first contribution to prioritization across productivity determinant capabilities that attempts to obtain the equivalent of a "shadow price" for each of these capabilities, which differs depending on income per capita clusters. 32 Results from this study point to the relevance of these determinants in affecting the success a country may have in reaching higher income per capita groups. The prioritization of these determinants, spanning different sectors, seems to be specific to the income per capita group a county belongs to. Moreover, our empirical estimates reveal that interactions among sectors are important when it comes to increasing the probability of climbing up the income per capita ladder, reflecting the existence of complementarities across sectors, thus indicating that the joint improvement of some of them may be necessary before effects on income per capita are noticeable. Results also indicate that the identification of priorities-by looking at the impact that sectors have in increasing the likelihood of advancing to a better income per capita group-may or may not coincide with the size of sector gaps, as larger gaps do not necessarily capture the relevance of sectoral restrictions and their interactions. 32 Ideally, a much larger time span than the one used here should be used to accumulate a larger set of experiences. However, important data gaps exist in sectoral indicators that make it almost impossible to apply this methodology to a larger time series data set. Note: Coefficient standard deviations are estimated using clustered errors at the country level. ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level. 
